Mandatory job placement system in Belarus: analysis and reform prospects
Every year the state forcibly assigns tens of thousands of young people who have just graduated colleges to jobs. BNYC “RADA” collaborated with Salidarnast, BSA, Maladaja Hramada, OGB, The Youth Bloc and Lichtar to analyze how it works, what the consequences are for economic and social sectors of Belarus, and what the reforms could be.
Following Article 72 of the Education Code 1 of the Republic of Belarus (hereinafter the Education Code), mandatory job placement for graduates is the procedure for determining the place of employment of a graduate, carried out by a state educational institution or, in certain cases, by a state body by decision of the Government of the Republic of Belarus. It is a direct legacy of the Soviet command-and-planning economy, in which the state centrally managed labor resources. According to the Education Code, the purpose of this procedure is to provide social support to graduates and to ensure that economic and social sectors are provided with specialists and employees.
We view mandatory job placement system in the context of forced labour standards under international law. Belarus has ratified both ILO Forced Labour Conventions (No. 29 and No. 105). Nearly every core feature of the placement system conflicts with them.
Moreover, economically this system does not look viable. It preservs low productivity instead of solving the staffing shortage, placing people in public sector with low salary.
This results in social problems, such as regional isolation, absence of housing and weakened social ties for young people, aggravation of gender inequality since young women are disproportionately placed in low-paid jobs,overall brain drain and ultimately strain on the state’s social systems.
There is a significant lack of publicly available data on the mandatory placement system. Official reports do not assess students’ satisfaction with the system, the effectiveness of their adaptation, or retention in their first assigned positions.
The total number of administrative and criminal cases involving graduates who evade placement through unlawful means is not recorded. These gaps significantly complicate the analysis of the system’s effectiveness.
What should be changed?
There is a lot to work on, but main recommendations of the analysis are as follows:
1. Transparent compensation calculation: a public, fixed formula + independent audit;
2. Independent appeals body: a commission not subordinate to the university;
3. Simplified re-assignment: the right to change employer for health, family reasons, or employer misconduct;
4. Flexible timing of service: choose when it starts + partial offset through volunteer work;
5. Payment installments: spread compensation over 5–10 years + write-offs for vulnerable groups;
6. Open statistics: public data on graduate retention after 1, 3, and 5 years.
