Review of the state report on youth: what remains behind the brackets

In August 2025, the “Report on the situation of youth in the Republic of Belarus 2024” appeared on the website молодежь.бел. Who prepared it remains a mystery: the document contains no indication of specific authors or institutions. Lizavieta Dauhulievich, Chairwoman of the “RADA”, carefully analyzed the report and prepared a substantive review.
The “Report on the situation of youth in the Republic of Belarus 2024″ gives the impression of a carefully polished document filled only with attractive figures and “achievements.” However, behind the provided statistics and positive wording lie serious internal problems that the authors deliberately avoid mentioning.
Firstly, the report provides detailed data on the number of young people across regions, but contains no information about those who have left the country. Meanwhile, a significant portion of young people (especially since 2020) have gone abroad to study or work, which distorts the demographic picture: the state reports on youth who may in fact have long been living outside Belarus. And this is not only about migration to EU countries — several thousand students are studying in Russia as well.
Secondly, the figures in the education section are alarming. The report cites a number of 224,000 students (including those in secondary-specialised institutions) for 2024/2025. Yet, according to BelTA, in 2019, there were 268,000 university students alone. This means the number of students is actually decreasing, but the report presents this as an achievement rather than a warning sign. Moreover, the section claims that students have the “right to choose study programs and institutions,” but ignores the reality: students in Belarus have no opportunity to study in the Belarusian language, nor to elect deans and rectors as is customary in European universities. Even the title of the section, “Accessibility and Quality of Education,” sounds ironic, since nothing is said about the state of campuses and dormitories, or about their accessibility for people with disabilities.
The topic of youth employment is also presented in a highly one-sided manner. The focus is on temporary student jobs, student brigades, and support for entrepreneurship. Yet, the report makes no mention of the infamous “law on social parasitism,” under which young people not engaged in the economy face state sanctions (for example, losing benefits or subsidies). Nor does it mention the system of mandatory job placement for graduates, which essentially functions as a modern form of serfdom: young specialists are forced to work for two years at minimal pay without the right to choose their employer.
The section on social activity appears even more contradictory. According to official data, 71.5% of youth “voluntarily” take part in patriotic events, and over 90% belong to youth public organisations. In practice, however, this is about forced involvement through administrative pressure, promises of benefits, or threats of punishment. The so-called youth organisations are in fact GONGOs — government-organised NGOs — where membership is often compulsory. This is not genuine activism or self-governance, but rather stage-managed crowds used to showcase “support” for the authorities.
In the section on youth and family, the state openly declares its commitment to promoting traditional values. Independent surveys, however, show that most students at BSU support LGBT rights and the possibility of same-sex marriage — yet the report remains silent on this. Divorce rates, which reach 55%, are also ignored; instead, the report highlights only the number of new marriages.
The section on combating extremism is equally problematic. The report uses the term “radical ideologies” without explaining what exactly is meant. Given the number of materials and organisations labelled extremist in Belarus, the term effectively covers anything related to demands for democracy, fair elections, or the use of historic national symbols. As a result, young people who dare to speak up for their rights can automatically be branded “extremists.”
The overall impression of the document is one of artificiality and showmanship. The authors do not mention how many youth civil society organisations have been liquidated over the past five years. There is not a single word about the number of young political prisoners. There is no section on youth mobility or international exchanges. For decades, the authorities have tried to seal Belarus’s western border so that the younger generation knows less about life in Europe and the greater opportunities people there enjoy.
Finally, it is unclear why the state report does not mention cooperation between youth and various spheres of public life. It is crucial that young people not merely wait for “opportunities” to be handed to them, but that they be able to speak directly to authorities about their needs and propose solutions. The explanation, however, is simple: such a system has never existed in Belarus. Today’s situation feels as if Belarus is a restaurant where young people are served the same dish every day, without anyone bothering to ask what they actually want to order.
